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Abstract 
Positive network effects arise where incremental product use increases the utility of users of compatible products 
(user-positive effects), but also in situations where product use imposes negative externalities that selectively 
affect the adopters of incompatible alternatives (nonuser-negative effects). This paper compares the social 
optimality of firms’ incentives for compatibility under these two regimes. Using a “location” model of 
differentiated products, I find that, under both regimes, incentives for unilateral action to increase compatibility 
tend to be suboptimal when firms’ networks are close in size, but they may be excessive for small firms when 
networks differ greatly in size. The result is consistent with prior analysis of the user-positive context (e.g., Katz 
& Shapiro, 1985), but challenges the intuition that activities involving negative externalities are always 
oversupplied in an unregulated market. Public policy implications are discussed. 
Keywords: networks, imperfect markets, compatibility, externalities 
1. Introduction 
There are many situations in which the value to a consumer from using a product increases, relative to 
alternatives, with the number of other users of the same product or compatible products. Such products are said 
to exhibit network effects. Almost exclusively, the network effects phenomena described in the literature involve 
positive consumption effects, or more precisely “user-positive effects,” whereby each consumer that uses the 
product increases the utility of other users of the product or compatible products (Note 1). Sometimes these 
effects are direct, such as on a telecommunications network, where utility derives directly from the number of 
people one may contact using the network. Other times, the effects are indirect. For instance, electronic game 
platforms provide greater benefit to users when more gaming software is available for use on them, and this 
tends to occur if they have more users. 
But network effects are not limited to users increasing each other’s utility. They also occur for products, or on 
platforms, characterized by users imposing costs on other people while simultaneously enjoying some degree of 
insulation against those costs. Such “nonuser-negative effects” occur as a result of what one may call “selective” 
negative externalities. For example, sport utility vehicles (SUVs) impose greater risks of injury and death on 
other motorists than do cars, while at the same time providing their occupants with increased protection against 
these same risks relative to cars (Note 2). Other examples include noisome products, ranging from cigarettes to 
noisy leaf blowers, for which adoption reduces the displeasure from others’ use; and situations in which 
non-adopters of a product or platform, such as ISO certification or expensive interview suits, incur a stigma that 
increases with the number of adopters (Note 3). In all these examples, incremental adopters increase other agents’ 
preferences for adopting the product or platform relative to its alternatives because they impose external costs 
selectively (i.e., exclusively or to a greater extent) on non-adopters. The result is what one might call an 
“if-you-can’t-beat-‘em-join-‘em” (IYCBEJE) network effect, whereby consumers join a bandwagon created by 
the increased undesirability of the alternative choice (Nagler, 2011). 
A key feature of the performance of markets with user-positive network effects is the scope of the relevant 
“network,” that is, the scope of the product set through which the benefits of compatibility flow. Can, for 
example, the products of different firms be used together? (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). It also matters how 
compatible other products–are they fully interoperable, or with some degree of limitation or impedence? (Cremer, 
Rey, & Tirole, 2000). These dimensions of compatibility affect not just the benefits derived by the individual 
user of the product, but also the competitive outcomes (e.g., prices and outputs), profits, and social welfare 
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derived. A number of theoretical papers have found that profit-maximization-based decisions on who to extend 
compatibility to, and how fully, do not generally lead to socially optimal outcomes (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986; 
Economides & Flyer, 1998; Church & Gandal, 2000; Malueg & Schwartz, 2006; Casadesus-Masanell & 
Ruiz-Aliseda, 2009). 
In markets involving nonuser-negative effects, compatibility comes into play just as it does with user-positive 
effects. When a consumer considers whether to use a selective-externality-imposing product or some alternative, 
she typically considers how well or badly the alternative will fare in terms of its relationship to the imposing 
product and how many units of the imposing product there are in use. For example, the prospective buyer of a 
car might wonder how well she will make out if she collides with an SUV, and how many SUVs she is likely to 
encounter on the road. The first question has to do with compatibility, and the second with the size of the 
relevant installed base (Note 4). 
A key strategic question facing the manufacturer in this context is how large to make the selective negative 
externality. That is, how incompatible should the product be with competing products (Note 5)? For example, the 
manufacturers of SUVs must consider how dangerous to make their vehicles to the occupants of cars. The 
question of the social optimality of firms’ incentives for compatibility in this case seems to have a trivially 
obvious answer. Because incompatibility directly increases relative preference through the IYCBEJE bandwagon, 
intuition suggests that private incentives for incompatibility would always be excessive. Public policy, one 
expects, could unambiguously improve welfare by reducing incompatibility at the margin. 
This paper compares incentives for compatibility under user-positive and nonuser-negative network effects 
regimes and looks at both relative to the social optimum. I analyze a “location” model of differentiated products. 
In this sense, the approach is similar to the analyses of network externalities offered by Farrell and Saloner (1992) 
and Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1992), and different from the homogenous products model of Katz and 
Shapiro (1985). I focus on incentives for unilateral action on compatibility (e.g., in the case of user-positive 
effects, developing an adapter), rather than joint action (e.g., developing a standard). I also restrict attention to a 
static environment (i.e., a single-period model). My findings for user-positive effects essentially replicate the 
results of Katz and Shapiro (1985) concerning the relationship of firm size to compatibility incentives. But my 
findings for nonuser-negative effects do not bear out the intuition about excessive incentives. Instead, I find 
incentives for incompatibility that follow closely, though not exactly, Katz and Shapiro’s results relating 
optimality of firms’ incentives to network size: whereas firms that are close in size tend to have socially 
excessive incentives for incompatibility, an imposing firm has insufficient incentives for incompatibility if its 
“network” (customer base) is relatively very small or very large. 
The next section lays out the general model. Section 3 derives welfare results for the user-positive case. Section 
4 derives welfare results for the nonuser-negative case. Section 5 offers a public policy discussion and concludes. 
2. A Model of Differentiated Product Duopoly with Network Effects 
Consider a market for two products, A and B, sold at prices pA and pB, respectively. Consumers are distributed 
uniformly on a unit segment based on their preferences for A versus B, with the total number of consumers 
normalized to 1. There are no outside goods: consumers choose whether to purchase A or B, and each consumer 
will choose at most one unit of one of the two products. I posit a general framework of network effects as given 
by the following utility functions, representing the utility that the consumer located at a point j (1≥ j ≥0) obtains 
from purchasing a unit of product A or B, respectively: 
U
A
j( ) = v +θ − t 1− j( ) + σ AλQA + σ BX λQB − pA                          (1) 
U
B
j( ) = v −θ − tj +σ BλQB +σ AX λQA − pB                           (2) 
Here, v represents the demand for all products; θ, which may be positive or negative, parameterizes the demand 
for A relative to B; t represents the intensity of consumers’ relative preferences for A or B (t > 0); Qi is the 
number of consumers who purchase product i (i = A, B); λ parameterizes the overall size of the network effect (λ 
≥ 0); and iσ  sizes and signs an own component of the network effect ( [ ]1,1iσ ∈ − ), while iXσ  similarly 
sizes and signs a cross component of the network effect ( [ ]1,1iXσ ∈ − ). A consumer who chooses neither A nor 
B receives utility of zero. Each consumer makes the choice that maximizes her utility. 
Now, consider two cases: (I) 1A Bσ σ= = , λ > 0 are given, and firm A sets [ ]0,1X AX BXσ σ σ≡ = ∈ ; and 
(II) 1AXσ = − ,σ A = σ B = σ BX = 0 are given, and firm A sets λ. The first case is the classic case of a 
user-positive network effect: incremental users of A and B provide a benefit, λ, to other users of the same product. 
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The decision that firm A faces is whether, and to what extent, to include firm B’s consumers in the network. 
Does firm A makes B’s consumers fully compatible with its own consumers, or partially compatible, or not at all? 
Here I assume, in Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) parlance, that the compatibility technology is an “adapter,” hence A 
and B are compatible if A unilaterally decides to undertake the expense to make them compatible. Note that the 
decision to make firm B’s consumers compatible also means that firm A’s consumers are compatible with firm 
B’s, so that B’s consumers receive increased network benefits as well; that is, the benefits are mutual. Since my 
purpose is to examine whether the level of compatibility chosen by a firm of a given network size is too high or 
too low, I assume without loss of generality that only A makes the decision of whether to make the products 
compatible. 
The second case involves a nonuser-negative effect: firm A considers the possibility of imposing a negative 
externality that only affects the users of product B. I will show that the effect of doing this is also to create a 
network externality: when λ > 0, the reservation price of users of A increases with the number of users of A, all 
else equal (Note 6). Obviously, A’s decision to make B’s users more incompatible with product A does not have a 
mutual effect: A’s users are not reciprocally harmed by users of B. That is, B is made more incompatible with A, 
but A is not made more incompatible with B. 
The relative private and social incentives for compatibility in this case might seem obvious. As discussed in the 
introduction, since the incompatibility decision involves a unilaterally imposed negative externality, the 
incompatibility incentives of firm A would seem always to be excessive, unlike in the case of user-positive 
effects. The model considers whether that expectation is correct. 
3. Equilibrium with User-Positive Effects 
Setting parameters to the values proposed for case (I) above, (1) and (2) become: 
U
A
j( ) = v +θ − t 1− j( ) + λQA +σ X λQB − pA                     (3) 
( )B B X A BU j v tj Q Q pθ λ σ λ= − − + + −                        (4) 
Assume v is large enough that all consumers choose A or B at equilibrium prices, implying 1A BQ Q= − (Note 
7). Combining (3) and (4) reveals that the consumer at j prefers A over B if 
2θ − t 1− 2 j( ) + 1−σ X( )λ QA − QB( ) + pB > pA . Therefore  
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 1j X A B Bt j Q Q pθ σ λΨ = − − + − − +                      (5) 
may be viewed as the consumer’s reservation price for A relative to B. It is interesting also to note that the 
relative quantity of A versus B matters more to the relative willingness-to-pay the less compatible the two 
products are. 
Following Katz and Shapiro (1985), we assume that firm A incurs a fixed cost of compatibility, ( )XC σ λ . This 
is assumed to depend upon the size of the compatibility benefit received by its users from each incremental user 
of B, and which B’s users receive in turn from the incremental user of A. For simplicity, assume 









λ                                   (6) 
while firm B sets Bp  to maximize 
B B Bp QΠ =                                     (7) 
I restrict attention to tλ < , which is required for a stable interior solution; otherwise a small exogenous shift of 
consumers between products results, through the network effect, in all consumers shifting. 
For an interior solution, * Aj pΨ = , where 
*j  represents the threshold consumer (i.e., *1AQ j= − ). 
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 − − 
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It is immediately clear from (11) that a corner solution is the only equilibrium when 12AQ ≥ : firm A would like 
to set 0Xσ <  because the marginal benefit of compatibility at any positive level of compatibility is negative 
when firm A has more than half the market. Meanwhile, for 12AQ < , the smaller AQ , the greater firm A 
wishes to set Xσ . Thus, the smaller the market share of a firm on this range, the greater its incentives for 
compatibility. 
Solving (10) and (12) together yields 
( )* * 231A Xp t σ λ θ= − − +                               (13) 
and 
( )* * 231B Xp t σ λ θ= − − −                             (14) 
Hence, consistent with Farrell and Saloner (1992), compatibility implies higher prices. Incentives to cut price to 
achieve greater sales through enlargement of the own-product-specific network effect are diminished the more 


















 − − 
                            (15) 
Solving (11) explicitly for ( )*1 Xσ λ−  yields two roots: 
( )* 161 1 1 8X kt kσ λ θ  − = + ± −                          (16) 
As we demonstrate in the appendix, the values of *Xσ  that correspond to both roots are maxima. It is not 
necessary to our welfare results to determine which value of *Xσ  is preferred by firm A; we are able to 
proceed with (16). Substituting (16) into (13) and (14) yields the following corresponding equilibrium prices and 
quantities: 
( ) ( )* * 2 1 2 13 6 3 6, 1 1 8 , 1 1 8A B k kp p k kθ θ θ θ   = − ± − − − ± −                  (17) 
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( )* * 1 12 22 2, ,





 = − + ± − ± − 
                        (18) 
Thus, in my simple model, firm A uses compatibility over the range of an interior solution as a “buffer” to keep 
AQ  at an optimizing level that is independent of θ . A lower level of demand will cause A to set Xσ  and 
Ap  higher (hence, Bp  will be higher as well – recall that prices rise with compatibility), keeping AQ  steady 
at the level given in (18). Meanwhile, when demand is high enough or low enough to correspond to a corner 








< < . At higher levels of demand, as inspection of (15) indicates, firm A sets 0Xσ =  and 







> (Note 8). When demand is 
below this lower threshold, firm A favors full compatibility, sets 1Xσ = , and again allows AQ  to vary 
positively with Ap . 
We now turn to the question of how the level of compatibility chosen by firm A relates to the social optimum. 
Define welfare as 






A B A B
j
W U j dj U j dj≡ Π + Π + +                           (19) 
Making substitutions from the model and differentiating with respect to Xσ , I obtain the following result: 
PROPOSITION 1: Unless the costs of compatibility are very large, when the firms are the same or close to the 
same size, the unilateral private incentives for each firm with respect to compatibility are too low. When the 
firms are not close in size, the smaller firm has socially excessive incentives to seek compatibility unilaterally. 
The proposition is essentially consistent with the findings of Katz and Shapiro (1985) that firms with large 
networks or good reputations are biased against compatibility, whereas those with small networks or weak 
reputations are biased in favor of it. 
4. Equilibrium with Nonuser-Negative Effects 
Now let us set parameters to the values proposed for case (II). (1) and (2) become: 
( ) ( )1A AU j v t j pθ= + − − −                         (20) 
( )B A BU j v tj Q pθ λ= − − − −                         (21) 
Again assume v large enough that all consumers choose A or B at equilibrium prices (Note 9). Combining (20) 
and (21) yields 
( )2 1 2j A BQ t j pθ λΨ = + − − +                         (22) 
as the consumer’s reservation price for A relative to B. Note that if 0λ >  the consumer’s relative reservation 
price for A increases with AQ ; this reveals that a negative externality that selectively affects nonusers fosters a 
network externality. 
Assume firm A incurs a fixed cost of incompatibility, ( )C λ , which depends upon the size of the 
incompatibility cost imposed on product B’s users by each incremental user of A. For simplicity, let us posit  
C λ( ) = kλ  for k ,λ > 0(Note 10). Firm A therefore sets Ap  and λ  to maximize. 
A A Ap Q kλΠ = −                                   (23) 
while, as in the previous case, firm B sets pB to maximize (7). 
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Solving (26) and (28) together yields 
* *2 1
3 3Ap t θ λ= + −                                  (29) 
* *2 2
3 3Bp t θ λ= − −                                 (30) 
Comparing (29) and (30) to (13) and (14), one is struck by the similarity of the equations. With Xσ  set to zero, 
the equations are identical, but for the coefficients on *λ . Thus, in the current case, we obtain a pricing result 
that is the precise flipside to the result in the previous case: incompatibility implies lower prices. In both the 
user-positive and nonuser-negative cases, the price effect is proportional to the size of the network effect. 
However, if one compares the price differential in the current case with the differential in the previous case, an 
important difference emerges. With user-positive effects, the price differential between the products is 
independent of the network effect. This follows naturally from the mutuality of the effect. But with 
nonuser-negative effects, the price premium for product A increases with the network effect. Because this case 
involves a negative externality imposed unidirectionally, the “victimized” product, B, is in effect degraded 
relative to imposing product A. 










                                 (31) 














                                 (32) 
Note that an interior solution in quantities requires 2tλ < , hence 19k <  for 2tθ < − , and 19k >  for 
2










. Thus, observing what happens as k approaches 19  in 
(31), it becomes evident that 19k >  implies a corner solution of 0λ =  for all 2tθ < − , and 19k <  implies 
0λ =  for all 2tθ > − . 
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Does *λ  given in (32) represent a maximum? Using (29) and (31), we may re-write the first derivative of A’s 





                                    (33) 
The second derivative is therefore  
2
2
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                                  (35) 
Successive substitution of (32) into (35) and then into (34) shows that the second derivative is positive when 
2
tθ > − , and negative otherwise. When demand for product A is relatively large, the marginal revenue product 
of λ  increases in λ , while marginal cost of λ  is constant. A corner solution equilibrium is the result: Firm 
A’s profits are maximized by setting λ  large enough to achieve 1AQ =  (if the cost of increasing λ  to this 
value is small enough relative to the benefit of taking the entire market) or else setting 0λ =  (if raising λ  is 
prohibitively costly). However, when demand for product A is relatively small, the marginal revenue product of 
λ  decreases in λ , while marginal cost is constant. Consequently, the first-order condition for profit 
maximization yields a maximum.  
For 2
tθ < − , the profit-maximum represented by (31) corresponds to the following prices and quantities: 












θθ  + −+   =
 − −
 
                       (36) 
( ) ( )* *, ,1A BQ Q k k= −                              (37) 
As in the case of user-positive effects, I obtain a “buffering” result, that is, Firm A sets λ as a buffer to keep 
AQ  at an optimizing level that is independent of θ . A lower level of θ  causes A to set λ  lower and Ap  
higher. Firm B raises Bp  as well – recall that prices fall with incompatibility – and the price differential 
B Ap p− , which is positive in this region of low relative demand for A, increases as λ  falls. Thus, AQ  
remains steady at the level given in (37). 
When demand is low enough to correspond to 0λ =  in (31), to wit, when 323t k tθ < − , equilibrium 
prices and quantities are given, respectively, by 
( ) ( )* * 2 23 3, ;A Bp p t tθ θ= + −                             (38) 
( ) ( )1 12 3 2 3, ;A B t tQ Q θ θ= + −                              (39) 
In this region, firm A favors full compatibility and allows QA to vary positively with pA. 
I now turn to the question of how the level of incompatibility chosen by firm A relates to the social optimum. 
Define welfare as above in (19). Substituting and integrating, I obtain 
[ ] [ ]2 22 tA A A AW t Q p t Q vλ θ λ θ= Π + − + − + − − + −                   (40) 
Differentiating with respect to λ, we obtain the following result: 
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PROPOSITION 2: When the imposing firm is small relative to its competitor, or when it is relatively large and 
the costs of incompatibility are large but not prohibitive, its incentives for incompatibility may be too low. When 
the imposing firm and its competitor are close in size, its incentives for incompatibility are too high, except when 
the costs of incompatibility are relatively large, in which case social and private incentives conform for zero 
incompatibility (i.e., perfect compatibility). 
Table 1 summarizes more specifically the social optimality outcomes with respect to firm A’s incompatibility 
decision in terms of the incompatibility cost parameter, k, and relative demand parameter. 
 
Table 1. Summary of social optimality outcomes for firm A’s incompatibility decision (nonuser-negative case) 
 θ < − 3t
2
 θ ∈ − 3t
2
,− t
2( )  θ ∈ − t2 , 3t2( )  θ > 3t2  
k ∈ 0, 1+ 2 7
27( )  Private and social incentives 
conform for 
λ = 0. 
There exists 
θ k( ) ∈ − 3t2 ,− t2( )  
such that for θ < θ  firm 
A sets λ  too low. 
θ ∈ − t
2
, 9tk
2( ): private and 
social incentives conform for 








( ) : 
firm A sets λ  too high. 







2( ) : 












k ∈ 1+ 2 7
27
, 1
3( )  θ ∈ − t2 ,t −1+2 7+27k6 ( ) : 
private and social incentives 
conform for λ = 0. 







2( ) : 




2( ) : private and social 














( ) : 
private and social incentives 
conform for λ = 0. 







2( ) : 




Private and social incentives 
conform for λ = 0. 
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θ. Parametric regions corresponding to incentives for incompatibility being too low are displayed in blue; 
regions in which incompatibility is too high are displayed in red. As with Proposition 2, the results are derived in 
the appendix. 
The intuition of the results for nonuser-negative effects can be seen from the car and sport-utility vehicle case 
example. When demands for cars and SUVs are relatively close in size, the SUV manufacturer’s incentives for 
incompatibility may be excessive. Making SUVs more hazardous to car drivers provides maximum benefit to the 
SUV manufacturer when the network sizes for the two vehicle types are near equal because the effect on SUV 
sales at the margin is greatest. However, the social cost of vehicle incompatibility is also highest in this situation, 
since the probability of deadly car versus SUV accidents is greatest when cars and SUVs coexist on the road in 
near equal numbers (White, 2004). 
Meanwhile, when SUVs significantly outnumber cars, the manufacturer’s incentives for incompatibility may be 
too low. This is because manufacturers fail to account for the social benefit that SUV-imposed external costs 
have of increasing homogeneity of the product mix, so that the incidence of car versus SUV accidents is reduced. 
Similarly, SUV firms’ incentives for incompatibility are too low when cars significantly outnumber SUVs. In 
this situation, the increase in the price differential between SUVs and cars has a negative effect on SUV sales 
that outstrips the positive network effect. So, though SUVs are made more dangerous, the number of SUVs 
declines sufficiently to increase welfare overall. In both cases of lopsided network size, the manufacturer 
considers mainly the marginal effect of incompatibility on his sales, and this is smaller the more lopsided the 
network sizes are. 
Though not exact, there is a strong correspondence between the results we obtained with respect to user-positive 
effects and those that arise under nonuser-negative effects. The clearest correspondence exists for firms with 
relatively low demand (i.e., small networks). I observe under nonuser-negative effects that such firms have 
suboptimal incentives for incompatibility from a social welfare perspective, just as firms with small networks 
had excessive incentives for compatibility under user-positive effects. When the two firms are close in size, the 
results also conform in most cases. When 2 7 127k
+<  and ( )1 2 7 2792 6, ktk tθ − + + ∈   , firm A sets λ  too high. 
Thus, under nonuser-negative effects, a firm’s incentives for incompatibility may be excessive for moderate 
levels of relative demand, so long as the costs of incompatibility are not too large. This corresponds to the case 
of moderate demand under user-positive effects, in which private incentives for compatibility are too low. 
Interestingly, with respect to firms with large networks, my results for the nonuser-negative case differ from Katz 
and Shapiro’s (1985) findings for the user-positive case. While Katz and Shapiro find that firms with large 
networks or good reputations tend to be biased against compatibility, I find that they might be biased against 
incompatibility. Specifically, for ( )2 7 1 127 3,k +∈ , when ( )1 2 7 27 96 2,k tktθ − + + ∈   , firm A sets λ  too low. 
The same thing happens for ( )1 23 3,k ∈  when ( )1 2 7 27 36 2,k ttθ − + + ∈   . 
5. Conclusion 
Previous analyses of incentives for compatibility in the context of network effects have focused on the case of 
user-positive effects. By and large, the results of these studies have suggested that firms focus primarily on 
compatibility as a tool to win over marginal customers, and they tend correspondingly to undervalue the utility 
that inframarginal customers gain from having a product that is compatible with products used by others. Thus, 
firms with large or moderate market shares, who have therefore a greater ratio of inframarginal to marginal 
consumers, tend to undervalue compatibility. Meanwhile, firms with small market shares place too much 
emphasis on it. 
This paper has shown that a similar pattern of compatibility preferences relative to the social optimum exists for 
small and mid-sized firms under nonuser-negative effects. As in the user-positive case, the result relates to firms’ 
incentives to win consumers at the margin; however, because the mechanism of the network effect is different in 
the nonuser-negative case, so is the logic of the result. Nonuser-negative effects result from negative externalities 
that users impose on nonusers, thus both their value to the imposing firm and their adverse social effects are 
stronger the more “contact points” there are between users and nonusers. For this reason, firms’ incentives for 
incompatibility tend to be excessive when market shares are near-equal. Correspondingly, when a firm has a 
small market share, the number of contact points with nonusers is diminished because the firm has a smaller 
installed base. This decreases its incentives for incompatibility. Meanwhile, the adverse social effects of 
incompatibility are also decreased, while the social benefit that increased incompatibility has through its ability 
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to shift consumers and increase homogeneity in the product mix becomes relatively prominent. The result is that 
a firm’s incentives for incompatibility may be too low when its market share is small. 
The paper has further indicated that, with respect to firms with large market shares, the social optimality of firms’ 
compatibility incentives may differ in the nonuser-negative case relative to the user-positive case. Indeed, the 
same mechanism is at work for large and small firms under nonuser-negative effects: private benefits to 
incompatibility are diminished when firm sizes are lopsided, but social benefits are increased. This represents a 
difference relative to the conventional, user-positive case. 
The general implication is that public policy has a role in encouraging compatibility when competing products 
have near-equal network sizes. This is true not only in the case of user-positive effects, but also when external 
costs are imposed selectively by users on non-users. Conversely, policy makers may need to dampen unilateral 
private incentives for compatibility at the margin when network sizes are lopsided. The surprising thing is that 
this may actually mean encouraging firms to impose larger external costs that selectively affect rivals’ products. 
For example, if SUVs represented a small enough share of the motor vehicle market, it might actually improve 
welfare to make them more hazardous to car drivers, because the price effects of doing would further curtail 
sales of SUVs. If instead the overwhelming majority of vehicles were SUVs, making them more hazardous 
would again improve welfare–in this case, by reducing further the number of car drivers that incur 
incompatibility losses due to SUVs. In both situations, increased incompatibility at a per-unit level improves 
welfare by increasing standardization and thereby reducing the adverse effects of incompatibility at an aggregate 
level. 
Beyond pure compatibility considerations, the broader implications of my results for public policy are perhaps 
equally surprising. The wisdom that external costs are provided excessively in the market and should be reduced 
is called into question when one considers that, in many cases, such costs have implications for the competitive 
equilibrium in markets (Note 11). Situations involving user-imposed externalities should be scrutinized to 
consider whether the externalities selectively, or asymmetrically, affect non-users (i.e., are nonuser-negative). 
The desirability of certain policy prescriptions, such as the use of Pigouvian taxes, might be affected by such 
asymmetries. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Such phenomena have been referred to as “positive consumption externalities” (e.g., Katz & Shapiro, 
1985, 1986; Economides, 1996), but recent analysis calls into question whether the positive consumption effects 
that give rise to network effects are always truly externalities. See, e.g., Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) and 
Farrell and Klemperer (2007, p. 2020). 
Note 2. Nagler (2014) measures the nonuser-negative effect of light trucks in the market for motor vehicles. 
Note 3. For a more extensive list of examples and discussion, see Nagler (2011). 
Note 4. In the field of highway safety analysis, the first question is recognized as a compatibility issue, with 
studies referring to the “crash test compatibility” of different vehicles. See Bradsher (2002). 
Note 5. External costs can often be manipulated through product design. SUVs generally have high, stiff front 
ends, and this increases the damage done to vehicles with which they collide; these effects could be undone 
through various design changes (Bradsher, 2002; Latin & Kasolas, 2002). Cigarettes could be manufactured to 
give off more or less smoke from the lit end, and the amount of smoke and noise emitted by gasoline-powered 
outdoor equipment could similarly be altered by design. Meanwhile, the size of the external costs that consumers 
perceive might be manipulated using marketing messages. For instance, calling greater attention to how 
imposing a particular SUV is might convince consumers that it is more dangerous to other motorists. (See 
Bradsher (2002) for examples of intimidating SUV advertisements.) By advertising, “Don’t be the last 
programmer in the market to get one,” a purveyor of computer programming certifications might enlarge 
perceptions of the stigma imposed on non-adopters by incremental adoptions. 
Note 6. Nagler (2011) examines a more general framework allowing [ ]1, 0
A
σ ∈ − , so that the degree of 
“selectivity” of the negative externality is a parameter in the analysis,. The extreme case 1
A
σ = −  represents a 
pure negative externality due to the use of product A, with no consequent network externality; while varying 
values of ( ]1, 0Aσ ∈ −  varies both the degree of selectivity and size of the network externality. 
Note 7. Consider v tθ ε≡ + +  for arbitrary 0ε > . Then, for all , 0
X
λ σ > , there exists 0
B
p >  such that 
0
B
U > . Thus v  satisfies the requirement. 
Note 8. Note that 
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Note 9. As shall be shown, 1
A B
Q Q+ = implies v does not appear in the first-order conditions for A’s profit 






, A’s profit-maximizing choice of λ  subject to all consumers choosing to 






+ ε  
satisfies the requirement for arbitrarily small 0ε > . 
Note 10. Nagler (2011) assumes a convex cost of incompatibility, with a linear, increasing marginal cost to 
enlarging the negative externality. The structure used here simplifies the equilibrium solution, but does not have 
a significant impact on the main results. 
Note 11. This issue is explored directly by Nagler (2011). 
 
Appendix A 
Second Order Conditions–Positive Consumption Externalities Case 
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Substitution into (41) yields 
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Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Making substitutions from the model in (19) and integrating, we obtain 
( ) ( )2 22 1 2 2 2 tA X A X A AW t Q t p Q vσ λ θ σ λ λ θ λ= Π + − − + + + − − + − + −       (46) 
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∂ <  for all interior solutions. 
Thus, whenever firm A’s network size is small enough that it chooses at least partial compatibility, it overinvests 
in compatibility. 
Now we consider the corner solution corresponding to 0Xσ = . We begin by noting that 0AXσ
∂Π
∂ ≠  at 








∂  back in. We do so and evaluate 
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∂ >  for θ  close to zero. 
 
Appendix C 
Proof of Proposition 2 and Derivation of Table 1 
To begin, let us differentiate (40) with respect to λ , assume an interior solution (i.e., ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − −  and 
1
9k < ), 
[ ] [ ]





0 2 1 2A A A
t
A A A A
Q p QW
A A A A
W t Q p t Q v
t Q Q Q p tλ λ λ λ
λ θ λ θ
λ θ λ∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= Π + − + − + − − + −
 = + − + − + + − + −
         (49) 




AA A Qp Q
tλ λ λ
−∂ ∂= − =
∂ ∂ −
                               (50) 
Substituting (29), (31), and (50) into (49) and factoring yields 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
3 21 4 1
3 3 3
3
2 2 2 4 2
3 2
W
t t t t t t
t
λ




− − − + − + − +
=
−
                (51) 
Since 2tλ <  on 0 1AQ< < , hence on c, it follows that 0Wλ∂∂ <  at 2tθ = − . If we can show that 
0Wλ
∂
∂ >  at 32tθ = − , then we will have proven that there exists ( ) ( )32 2,t tkθ ∈ − −  such that, for θ θ< , 
firm A sets λ  too low. In the neighborhood of 32tθ = − , Aλ
∂Π
∂  approaches k− . So, using (51), and 
substituting in 32
tθ = −  and 0λ = , we obtain: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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           (52) 
So, 0Wλ
∂
∂ >  if and only if 13k < . This satisfies the interior solution requirement of 19k < , so we have proven 
the first part for this case. 
Now consider ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − −  with ( )1 19 3,k ∈ . In this case, k is sufficiently large that a corner solution of 
0λ =  holds for all 2tθ < − . Note that 0Aλ
∂Π
∂ ≠  at 0λ = ; therefore we may substitute (52) in for Wλ∂∂ , but 
we must add  
∂ΠA
∂λ  back in. We do so and evaluate the resulting expression at 0λ = , simplifying: 
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= =  = − > −                          (54) 
It remains to check the sign of Wλ
∂
∂  at the endpoints of the interval. At 
3
2
tθ = − , 13W kλ∂∂ = − , which is 
positive for 13k < . At 2tθ = − , it can shown using (53) that 0Wλ∂∂ < . Therefore, for ( )1 19 3,k ∈ , there exists 
( ) ( )32 2,t tkθ ∈ − −  such that, for θ θ< , firm A sets λ  too low. (It may be observed in passing that 13k >  
implies 0Wλ
∂
∂ <  everywhere on ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − − , so private and social incentives conform for setting 0λ =  
when ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − −  and 13k > .) 
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Now consider ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − . As noted in the text, this range corresponds to a corner solution in λ : firm A sets 
λ  to achieve 1AQ =  when the cost of increasing λ  is small enough, and it sets 0λ =  otherwise. Using 
(31), we find that 32 tλ θ= −  corresponds to 1AQ = . Using (23) and comparing firm A’s profits at 0λ =  
with its profits when 1AQ =  and 32 tλ θ= − , we find that firm A will opt for 1AQ =  when 29tk θ< , or, 
rearranging, when 92 tkθ > . Thus, we are able to recast firm A’s threshold in terms of a level of demand large 
enough to make increasing λ  worthwhile. 
The corresponding social threshold in θ  for raising λ  to set 1AQ =  is derived by substituting 0λ =  into 
0Wλ
∂
∂ =  and solving for θ . Setting (53) equal to zero and solving for θ  yields (using quadratic formula) 
1 2 7 27
6
ktθ − ± + =   . Here, only the positive-signed root corresponds to ( )32 2,t tθ ∈ − , so that is the relevant 
one. One can check that 1 2 7 276




∂ >  in (53). 
Equating the social and private thresholds and solving for k : 
1 2 7 27 1 2 79
6 2 27
k tkt k− + + ±  =  =                             (55) 
where only the positive-signed root corresponds to 0k >  and is therefore relevant. Thus, for 1 2 727k +> , the 
private threshold level of θ  exceeds the social threshold, so that for ( )1 2 7 27 36 2,k ttθ − + + ∈   , firm A sets λ  
too low, while for 
 







( ) , firm A’s incentives conform with social incentives for setting 
0λ = . Meanwhile, for 1 2 727k +< , the social threshold exceeds the private threshold, so that for 
( )1 2 7 2792 6, ktk tθ − + + ∈   , firm A sets λ  too high. When ( )92 2,t tkθ ∈ − , 1 2 727k +<  corresponds to firm 
A’s incentives conforming with social incentives for setting 0λ = . Finally, ( )1 2 7 27 36 2,k ttθ − + + ∈    and 
1 2 7
27k
+<  imply that private and social incentives conform for setting 32 tλ θ= −  and 1AQ = . 
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